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How Should Feminist Autonomy Theorists Respond to the Problem 
of Internalized Oppression? 
 
 In “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,”1 Natalie Stoljar asks 
whether a procedural or a substantive approach to autonomy is best for 
addressing feminist concerns.2 On the most general level, a theory is pro-
cedural if it does not a priori rule out any specific decisions or prefe-
rences. In other words, as long as you follow the given procedure to 
come to a decision, whatever decision you make is considered autonom-
ous. In contrast, substantive theories tend to include additional criteria 
such as requiring sufficient self-respect or self-worth3 or requiring specif-
ic content of beliefs or preferences such as knowing the difference be-
tween right and wrong.4 Another key difference is that procedural theo-
ries rely solely on the subjective perspective or the “internal” decision-
making process, whereas strong substantive theories include nonsubjec-
tive criteria or certain “external” value judgments.  
 Ultimately, Stoljar argues that feminists should adopt a substantive 
approach to autonomy. I will build on Stoljar’s argument. Since Stoljar 
gives an in-depth analysis of why procedural theories cannot adequately 
address feminist concerns, I only briefly explain this problem in the first 
section.5 Specifically, I emphasize how procedural theories fail to ade-
                                                 
 1Natalie Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” in Catriona Mackenzie and 
Natalie Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, 
and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 94-111. 
 2For examples of feminist discussions about the pros and cons of procedural versus 
substantive theories of autonomy, see Paul Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Sociali-
zation,” Social Theory and Practice 17 (1991): 385-408; “Free Agency and Self-Worth,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 91 (1994): 650-68; “Freedom and Value,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 84 (1987): 465-86; Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Mackenzie and Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy; 
Diana T. Meyers, Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women’s Agency (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002). 
 3Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth”; Robin S. Dillon, “Toward a Feminist Con-
ception of Self-Respect,” Hypatia 7 (1992): 52-69. 
 4Susan Wolf, “Asymmetrical Freedom,” The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 151-66. 
 5In her analysis, Stoljar considers five different ways that procedural theorists inter-
pret the critical reflection necessary for autonomy. She argues that none of these versions 
can adequately account for the feminist intuition that decisions influenced by oppressive 
  
 
quately address what is pernicious about some forms of socialization or 
the problem of internalized oppression.6 Stoljar further argues that femin-
ist autonomy theorists should adopt a strong substantive theory. In the 
second section, I build on this argument by starting to articulate my own 
theory.7 I use two similar cases to explain my theory and show how a 
strong substantive theory can more accurately address the problem of 
internalized oppression. In the final section, I briefly address some of the 
concerns raised by procedural theorists who are leery of a substantive 
approach. Specifically, procedural theorists worry that substantive au-
tonomy unduly narrows the scope of autonomy and overemphasizes 
women’s victimhood while ignoring their agency. In contrast, I argue 
that procedural theorists are too generous in their definition of autonomy.   
 
 
The Problem 
 
Procedural autonomy theorists believe that autonomy has to do with how 
people make decisions rather than the specific content of the decisions.8 
For this reason, procedural theories are considered “content neutral.” In 
general, an agent uses critical (or self-) reflection to learn about herself 
(increase self-knowledge). Critical reflection means that a person must 
reflect (or at least be willing to reflect) on her personal preferences (in-
cluding desires, beliefs, values, and goals). Through this process of re-
flection, she will identify with some preferences and reject others. This is 
                                                                                                             
norms of femininity should not count as autonomous. 
 6My understanding of oppression is that it is a harm inflicted on an individual based 
on her group membership. Internalized oppression is internalized norms that lead a per-
son to participate in perpetuating her own oppression. For more detailed definitions of 
oppression, see Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenome-
nology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990); Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays 
in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Cal.: The Crossing Press, 1983). 
 7Stoljar considers two versions of Paul Benson’s normative competence criteria and 
argues that the stronger version is necessary to account for the feminist intuition (for 
more on the theories she uses, see Benson, “Free Agency and Self-Worth,” and “Freedom 
and Value”). I argue that this version (discussed later in the paper) is insufficient and 
needs more definition about what specific beliefs or reasons are problematic. Benson’s 
weaker version discusses self-worth, or self-respect; I also discuss this criterion, but do 
not interpret it exactly in the same way Benson uses it.  
 8A sample of procedural autonomy theorists includes: John Christman, “Autonomy 
and Personal History,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991): 1-24; Gerald Dwor-
kin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Harry G. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Es-
says (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, 
Politics; Diana T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). 
 
 
how she makes preferences “her own” or creates an authentic self. Auto-
nomous decisions or actions will be those that are in keeping with her 
self-chosen preferences or her authentic self. Developing preferences that 
are “our own” and living in harmony with them is what it means to be 
autonomous. In this way, procedural theorists claim that autonomy has to 
do with how a decision is made, not what decision is made. With this 
overview, we can see that procedural autonomy theorists emphasize crit-
ical reflection, authenticity, and content neutrality. I consider these to be 
the key components of a procedural approach to autonomy theory. 
 Procedural theorists often make distinctions between preferences, be-
liefs, values, goals, and principles. While I recognize that these are not 
the same thing, what they have in common is that procedural theorists 
believe they must be open to self-reflection to count as autonomous. In 
other words, regardless of whether they are discussing preferences, be-
liefs, values, goals, or principles, procedural theorists assess autonomy 
from the “internal” or subjective perspective. For this reason, I do not be-
lieve a fine-tuned distinction is necessary here. Instead, I will use “prefe-
rences” as a shorthand for these various self-reflections and endorsements. 
 As we turn our attention to substantive autonomy, things become 
more complicated. Instead of relying on the general procedure for auto-
nomous decision-making, substantive theorists use a wider variety of 
approaches. For this reason, it is more difficult to summarize the key 
components of substantive theories. We can start by separating substan-
tive approaches into weak substantive theories and strong substantive 
theories.9 In general, I argue that weak substantive theories are “supple-
mental”—they add requirements to the procedure for autonomous deci-
sion-making. For example, Trudy Govier adopts Diana Meyers’s proce-
dural approach to autonomy, but argues that women must also have self-
trust for the procedure to be efficacious.10 Like procedural theorists, 
weak substantive theorists rely mainly on an internal process of critical 
or self-reflection, but argue that the procedure will “work” (yield an au-
tonomous decision) only if the person has the proper “self-trust” (or oth-
er self-reflexive attitudes). In contrast, strong substantive theories go 
“beyond” the subjective perspective that procedural theorists insist on. 
Instead of relying on an internal (subjective) procedure for autonomous 
decision-making, strong substantive theorists argue that autonomy requires 
specific nonsubjective or “external” criteria. In this discussion I will fo-
cus on strong substantive theories.11 
                                                 
 9I take this general category distinction from the literature review in Mackenzie and 
Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy, pp. 3-31. 
 10Trudy Govier, “Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem,” Hypatia 8 (1993): 99-
120. 
 11In addition to the Govier article, another example of a weak substantive approach is 
  
 
 Stoljar understands why some feminist theorists are drawn to a proce-
dural approach. One feminist criticism of traditional autonomy theories is 
that these theories seem to require substantive independence and other 
“masculine” norms. In contrast, feminists want a theory of autonomy that 
can accommodate a wide range of preferences. For these reasons, many 
feminists find an approach to autonomy that does not rule out any specif-
ic preferences (the content neutrality of procedural theories) very attrac-
tive. Given feminist work on social construction, feminist autonomy 
theorists also want to develop a theory that can rule out as autonomous 
preferences that are the result of harmful forms of socialization. Most 
recent theories of autonomy admit that we are all products of our sociali-
zation (hence the name “relational autonomy”) and—in this sense—none 
of our preferences is completely “our own.” However, feminist auton-
omy theorists want to account for the difference between benign and 
pernicious forms of socialization. For example, Diana Meyers states: 
 
The question is not whether to have a coercive or a noncoercive form of childhood socia-
lization. Since there is no such thing as noncoercive childhood socialization, but since 
socialization is an inescapable feature of civilization, some form of coercive socialization 
must be justifiable. Indeed, it is not the coerciveness of socialization that generally draws 
fire. It is when socialization harms peoples that the process itself falls under suspicion.12 
 
Thus, one question a feminist autonomy theorist must address is which 
types of socialization are acceptable and which are not. 
 Feminists who defend procedural theories believe they can adequately 
account for pernicious aspects of socialization in the procedure itself, 
thereby addressing feminist concerns but also keeping the content neu-
trality they cherish.13 Stoljar is skeptical about this approach. 
 
Despite the apparent advantages, however, feminists should be cautious about adopting a 
purely procedural account of autonomy. In certain cases, even preferences satisfying the 
standards of critical reflection that are required by procedural accounts would still be 
                                                                                                             
Carolyn McLeod, Self-Trust and Reproductive Autonomy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
2002). Examples of strong substantive approaches include: Susan M. Babbitt, Impossible 
Dreams: Rationality, Integrity, and Moral Imagination (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 
1996); Wolf, “Asymmetrical Freedom.” For the moment, I avoid discussing weak subs-
tantive theories because I am not sure that the distinction between weak and strong subs-
tantive theories can be maintained. If we take seriously some of the added requirements 
included by weak substantive theorists, then those requirements seem to be doing most of 
the work (which makes the procedural requirement superfluous). Also, if we take them 
seriously enough, they indirectly rule out certain desires or reasons for acting in the same 
way strong substantive theories do. For example, could someone with sufficient self-
respect autonomously adopt certain subservient beliefs influenced by oppressive sociali-
zation? 
 12Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, p. 207. 
 13For examples, see Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics; Meyers, Self, Society, 
and Personal Choice. 
 
 
regarded as nonautonomous by many feminists. This is because such preferences are 
influenced by pernicious aspects of the oppressive context. They therefore attract what I 
call the feminist intuition, which claims that preferences influenced by oppressive norms 
of femininity cannot be autonomous.14 
 
Stoljar questions whether the “pernicious aspects of [an] oppressive con-
text” can be adequately captured and filtered out by a formal procedure. 
She believes that many feminists rightly question the autonomy of some 
decisions even if they appear to be in keeping with preferences that were 
reflectively endorsed. She calls this skepticism “the feminist intuition”—
the idea that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms” cannot be 
autonomous. Stoljar argues that the only way to adequately address the 
feminist intuition is to adopt a substantive approach to autonomy theory. 
I agree.  
 Although preferences could be influenced by oppressive norms in a 
variety of ways, I will focus on internalized oppression. In this paper, I 
will argue that the only way to adequately address the problem of inter-
nalized oppression is with a substantive theory of autonomy. This is be-
cause procedural theories rely only on the subjective perspective,15 but 
we cannot articulate (and thereby rule out) what is pernicious about some 
forms of socialization with a purely formal procedure that remains com-
mitted to the subjective perspective. I argue that decisions resulting from 
false beliefs that rely on subordinating reasoning and perpetuate oppres-
sion should not count as autonomous. However, this uses nonsubjective 
or external criteria to decide what counts as autonomous.  
 Using the criteria just outlined, I will argue that decisions that reflect 
a certain devaluation of self (or lack of self-worth) should not count as 
autonomous. This troubles procedural theorists because it violates the 
content neutrality they cherish. Procedural theorists are committed to 
content neutrality because they are committed to the subjective perspec-
                                                 
 14Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” p. 95. 
 15Many feminist approaches to autonomy have focused on what is called relational 
autonomy. In these approaches, theorists discuss how autonomy is developed and ex-
pressed in a social context. For example, Meyers identifies a list of skills necessary for 
making autonomous decisions that she calls “autonomy competencies.” In this way, 
many feminist theorists try to account for nonsubjective or external influences on auton-
omy. However, those theorists who remain committed to the procedural approach will 
still fall back on the internal decision-making procedure of reflection and endorsement 
when considering whether a specific decision is or is not autonomous. This is problematic 
when trying to account for internalized oppression because a key aspect of internalized 
oppression is that it distorts a person’s preferences. I will say more about internalized 
oppression and the procedure for autonomous decision-making later in the paper. Here I 
simply want to acknowledge that feminist theorists committed to the procedural approach 
do discuss some nonsubjective or external influences on autonomy. However, my argu-
ment is that their analysis of these external factors is not sufficiently integrated into their 
procedure for autonomous decision-making. 
  
 
tive; therefore, they argue that any decision stemming from the appropri-
ate internal decision-making process (as outlined above) should count as 
autonomous. Thus, procedural theorists would argue that my substantive 
theory unduly restricts the scope of autonomy or the range of decisions 
that would count as autonomous.  
 
 
Can Subservient Wives Be Autonomous? 
 
Case 1: The Deferential Wife 
 
To understand better why feminists need a substantive theory of auton-
omy, consider Thomas Hill’s classic example of the Deferential Wife. As 
Hill describes her: 
 
This is a woman who is utterly devoted to serving her husband. She buys the clothes he 
prefers, invites the guests he wants to entertain, and makes love whenever he is in the 
mood … She loves her husband, but her conduct is not simply an expression of love. She 
is happy, but she does not subordinate herself as a means to happiness. She does not 
simply defer to her husband in certain spheres as a trade-off for his deference in other 
spheres. On the contrary, she tends not to form her own interests, values, and ideals; and, 
when she does, she counts them as less important than her husband’s. She readily re-
sponds to appeals from Women’s Liberation that she agrees that women are mentally and 
physically equal, if not superior, to men. She just believes that the proper role for a wom-
an is to serve her family. As a matter of fact, much of her happiness derives from her 
belief that she fulfills this role very well. No one is trampling on her rights, she says; for 
she is quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband as she does.16  
 
Most feminists would agree that Hill is describing a classic case of inter-
nalized oppression. Despite her stated belief that men and women are 
equal, her behavior and her belief that “the proper role of women is to 
serve the family” illustrate how she has internalized oppressive norms of 
femininity.17 Using this example, I will illustrate the difference between a 
feminist procedural approach to autonomy and my substantive approach. 
 In Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Marilyn Friedman gives us a feminist 
example of a procedural approach to autonomy. According to Friedman, 
if a person’s choices and actions are to be autonomous, she must reflect 
on her wants and values—choosing to endorse some and, presumably, 
reject others. Also, a person’s decisions should reflect those wants and 
values she has endorsed (or what is important to her). In sum, Friedman 
                                                 
 16Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), pp. 5-6 (emphasis in original). 
 17For examples of how feminine norms can feel empowering at the same time as they 
are perpetuating women’s (including the individual woman’s) oppression, see Bartky’s 
analysis of emotional caring and both Bartky’s and Meyers’s analysis of feminine beauty 
norms. Bartky, Femininity and Domination; Meyers, Gender in the Mirror. 
 
 
is advocating the process of critical reflection as I have described it. 
Friedman, like other procedural theorists, also emphasizes content neu-
trality.18 The only constraint she puts on the process of reflection is that it 
must be “relatively unimpeded by conditions, such as coercion, decep-
tion, and manipulation.”19 Let us compare an earlier analysis Friedman 
made of Hill’s Deferential Wife to her more recent theory of autonomy. 
 Hill argues that certain forms of servility are wrong because a person 
ignores her worth as an equal moral being. Friedman agrees that some 
forms of servility are wrong, but disagrees with Hill’s reasoning. Specifi-
cally, Friedman argues that it would be okay for a woman to defer to her 
husband’s preferences if (a) in doing so his preferences become her pre-
ferences and (b) she does so without violating her own moral ideals or 
principles. Friedman claims that if a woman believes it is her duty to 
serve her husband, then “this means that she takes the preferences of cer-
tain other persons for her own; they become her preferences as the result 
of a moral commitment on her part.”20 Once a woman decides that it is 
her proper role to serve her husband, then his preferences become her 
preferences. Thus, according to Friedman, submitting to his preferences 
is a self-defining commitment. She also argues that the Deferential 
Wife’s servility is a problem only if she submits to her husband’s prefe-
rences uncritically, because this undermines her moral integrity. How-
ever, as long as the Deferential Wife submits only to those preferences 
that do not violate her own moral ideals or principles, then she can main-
tain her moral integrity, and thus her status as a moral being.21 Although 
she does not use the language of autonomy here, it seems that Friedman 
would have to argue that the Deferential Wife’s commitment to servility 
is also an autonomous decision as long as she does not submit to fulfil-
ling her husband’s preferences “uncritically.” 
 In contrast, Marcia Baron defends Hill’s analysis and argues that 
Friedman’s argument misses the point about what is really wrong with 
this form of servility. Baron and Hill argue that what is wrong is not 
whether the Deferential Wife ultimately adopts her husband’s prefe-
rences or retains her moral integrity by not submitting to preferences that 
violate her moral ideals, but that her decision to submit to her husband in 
the first place is the problem.  
 
The problem isn’t that I didn’t critically examine his preferences before deferring to 
them; critical examination of my reasons for deferring would be much more in order here 
                                                 
 18Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, pp. 19-25. 
 19Ibid., p. 14. 
 20Marilyn Friedman, “Moral Integrity and the Deferential Wife,” Philosophical Stu-
dies 47 (1985): 141-50, p. 144. 
 21Ibid., pp. 145-47. 
  
than scrutiny of the preferences. In short, the Deferential Wife’s flaw can’t be her failure 
to subject to scrutiny the preferences to which she defers.22 
 
In other words, the problem is not that the Deferential Wife failed to util-
ize the formal procedure for making autonomous decisions (or failed to 
put her beliefs through some process of self-reflection and endorsement), 
but it is the beliefs themselves (or her reasons for deferring) that spark 
the feminist intuition. It is the nature of the servility (i.e., deferring to her 
husband because it is a women’s proper role) that raises the feminist in-
tuition, because it expresses oppressive norms of femininity. Indeed, Ba-
ron and Hill argue that the problem with the Deferential Wife’s servility 
is that she does not understand herself as an equal moral being, and, as 
Hill argues, “consent resulting from underestimation of one’s moral sta-
tus is not autonomously given.”23  
 I believe that Baron’s and Hill’s analysis more accurately captures the 
feminist intuition. It is the nature of the servility that raises the feminist 
intuition, because it also replicates oppressive norms of femininity. In 
sketching out how a substantive theory of autonomy would approach this 
problem, I try to articulate Baron’s and Hill’s intuition in a more method-
ical way. The Deferential Wife has false beliefs (i.e., that women’s 
“proper role” is to serve their family) that rely on subordinating reason-
ing (i.e., it is the wife’s duty to subsume her preferences to her hus-
band’s) and that perpetuate her own oppression (e.g., reinforcing restric-
tive roles for women and undermining women’s equality).24  
 Let me be clear that I am not arguing that women could never auton-
omously choose to be stay-at-home wives or defer to their partners in 
some things or situations.25 I am arguing that some forms of servility and 
deference cannot be autonomous—namely, those that are the result of 
internalized oppression. In sum, I am arguing that feminists need a strong 
substantive theory of autonomy that assesses both the specific beliefs 
influencing a person’s decision and how those beliefs relate to the broad-
er social context. I am arguing that false beliefs that rely on subordinat-
ing reasoning and perpetuate oppressive systems are forms of interna-
                                                 
 22Marcia Baron, “Servility, Critical Deference, and the Deferential Wife,” Philosoph-
ical Studies 48 (1985): 393-400, p. 398. 
 23Hill, Autonomy and Self-Respect, p. 13. 
 24For examples of how this form of traditional gender roles perpetuates women’s 
oppression (including the individual woman’s oppression), see Linda R. Hirshman, Get to 
Work: A Manifesto for Women of the World (New York: Viking, 2006); Susan Moller 
Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989). 
 25In our current society, though, any choice to stay home will be suspect given not 
only gender norms, but also economic pressures. However, since my focus in this paper 
is internalized oppression, I will not pursue the potentially coercive effects of other forms 
of oppression. For a discussion of other forms of oppression, see Cudd, Analyzing Op-
pression.  
 
 
lized oppression, and therefore decisions that result from these beliefs 
should not count as autonomous. 
 I do not believe that all false beliefs are a problem. Consider a base-
ball player who believes he must wear his lucky socks to win a game. 
Many of us would consider this a false belief, but I do not think it would 
raise the feminist intuition. It is a rather benign belief and it is unlikely to 
be the result of “pernicious forms of socialization.” We could also have 
subordinating beliefs that do not contribute to an oppressive system. 
Consider a committed activist who chooses to defer decisions and public 
attention to a charismatic leader. This is a type of subordination, but not 
necessarily a pernicious one. If we put these together, we can see that 
what raises the feminist intuition are subordinating beliefs that perpetuate 
oppression. Therefore, we must look at how a belief or reasons for a be-
lief situate groups in relation to each other. I believe that this is what 
raises the feminist intuition and leads some feminists to argue that these 
decisions are not autonomous. 
 
Case 2: The Surrendered Wife 
 
Let us return to the debate over the Deferential Wife, but use a real-life 
example. In 2001, Laura Doyle published The Surrendered Wife. Accord-
ing to Doyle, “The underlying principle of The Surrendered Wife is sim-
ple: the control women wield at work and with children must be left at the 
front door of any marriage to revitalize intimacy.”26 Her book has received 
a number of positive reviews and substantial media coverage. She contin-
ues to give public talks supporting her philosophy and, according to at 
least one news special in 2007, more than 100,000 women have adopted 
her program. Although Doyle claims that this is not about subservience, 
she does compare it to ballroom dancing, where one person must lead (the 
husband) and the other must follow (the wife). Also, the point of “surren-
dering” is that the woman gives up control (specifically of the finances and 
her opinions) and learns to trust her husband.27 In the news reports of 
specific couples who have adopted this approach, the wife does every-
thing from drawing her husband’s bath, to having him approve her list of 
daily chores, to giving him complete control over when they have sex.28 
In this way, the women are very similar to Hill’s Deferential Wife who 
submits to her husband’s every wish and whim. In other words, a wom-
an’s decision to become a Surrendered Wife raises the feminist intuition. 
                                                 
 26Laura Doyle, The Surrendered Wife (2001; accessed March 19, 2009); www.    
surrenderedwife.com. 
 27Ibid. 
 28Peter Harvey, Under the Thumb (2007; accessed March 19, 2009); http://sixtyminutes. 
ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=270407. 
  
 There are a number of ways to interpret the decision to become a Sur-
rendered Wife. To clarify my position, I will consider three—the kind of 
oppressive norms reflected in this decision, the nature of the subordina-
tion, and what this case tells us about the relationship between oppressive 
socialization and the procedure for autonomy. 
 First, many of the women who “choose” to become a Surrendered 
Wife seem to be motivated by the desire to save the relationship at the 
expense of other desires.29 In response to a question about why she chose 
to become a Surrendered Wife, Caroline says, “I was getting to the point 
in my marriage where I wasn’t happy. And Chip and I were not getting 
along at all and we were talking about maybe just me going and doing 
my own thing.” Similarly, the statements made by many of these women 
imply that it was easier to acquiesce than to keep fighting with their hus-
bands. For example, Doyle says, “My loneliness was so acute I was will-
ing to try anything to cure it … Fortunately, the steps of surrendering 
helped me with both marital tranquility and self-respect.”30 Here we have 
presumably competent, independent women who found their relation-
ships in trouble. Rather than forgo the relationship, they chose to “sur-
render” their equality. Obviously it is impossible to know all the reasons 
each woman made these choices, but the fact that so many independent 
women would “choose” to give up independence rather than be single 
raises my feminist intuition.  
 Also, once the women “chose” to become Surrendered Wives, they 
seem to adopt a variety of negative female stereotypes that are the result of 
oppressive norms of femininity. For example, Caroline says, “Shutting my 
mouth is kind of very hard. That’s been the hardest for me but I’ve learned 
to do it.”31 I argue that statements like this show a subtle form of interna-
lized oppression—namely, the idea that women should not be overly opi-
nionated or at least not assertive about expressing their opinions or beliefs. 
Consider another quote from Doyle: “None of us feels good about our-
selves when we’re nagging, critical, or controlling. I certainly didn’t. The 
tone of my voice alone would make me cringe with self-recrimination. 
Through surrendering, you will find the courage to gradually stop indulg-
ing in these unpleasant behaviors and replace them with dignified 
ones.”32 Again, this sounds like a woman who is motivated by oppressive 
norms of femininity—namely, that women should be quiet, passive, and 
unopinionated instead of assertive and in control of their lives.33 
                                                 
 29I thank Allyson Robichaud for this insight. 
 30Doyle, The Surrendered Wife. 
 31Harvey, Under the Thumb. 
 32Doyle, The Surrendered Wife. 
 33I should point out that Doyle centers her theory around women’s need to control 
men. I admit that many in our culture are taught to obsess about what others are doing or 
 
 
 Taken together, these quotes show that many women are motivated 
by oppressive norms of femininity when deciding to become a Surren-
dered Wife. To explain why we should not consider decisions that are the 
result of oppressive norms of femininity autonomous, I attempt to clarify 
what is problematic about these decisions. They rely on false beliefs 
(e.g., assertive women are “shrewish”) that lead to subordination (e.g., 
wife allows husband to control daily decisions) and perpetuate oppres-
sion (e.g., reinforce negative stereotypes, leave women vulnerable, and 
so on). I further claim that this is another way to interpret Hill’s and Ba-
ron’s claim that the problem with the Deferential Wife is that she unde-
restimates her worth as an equal moral being. To elaborate on this point, 
I turn to my second interpretation of the Surrendered Wife phenomenon. 
 Another way to understand what is problematic about the decision to 
become a Surrendered Wife is to consider what “surrendering” entails or 
the nature of the subordination. Autonomy theorists have long argued 
about whether one could “autonomously” choose to submit to slavery or 
the idea of how much autonomy you can willingly relinquish. To help 
explain where I draw the line and why, I compare my interpretation to 
Marina Oshana’s theory of autonomy.34  
 Oshana criticizes what she calls “internalist” or “psychological” theo-
ries of autonomy (what I call procedural), and instead proposes an “exter-
nalist” or “socio-relational” theory of autonomy (what I call substantive). 
Oshana’s approach is similar to mine in that we both argue that you can-
not fully articulate what counts as autonomous from only the subjective (or 
internal) view. However, Oshana and I differ on how we should interpret 
external constraints or the interplay between internal and external aspects 
of autonomy. Oshana argues that certain external constraints undermine 
autonomy because they take away a person’s ability to control her life.35 
Based on this argument, Oshana argues that a monk has relinquished his 
autonomy because he has given control over his life to another.36 I dis-
                                                                                                             
not doing and try to control them in various ways. For a good analysis of power-with 
instead of this type of power-over, see Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward 
New Values (Palo Alto, Cal.: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988); Starhawk, Truth or 
Dare: Encounters with Power, Authority, and Mystery (New York: HarperCollins, 1990). 
However, Doyle’s analysis is very different from Hoagland’s or Starhawk’s. Rather than 
discussing how we should reframe disagreements and our attitudes toward others, Doyle 
claims that we should replace women trying to control men with men controlling (or as 
she puts it “leading”) women and the family.  
 34Marina Oshana, Personal Autonomy in Society (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006). 
 35In this paper, I am mainly concerned with internalized oppression, so my emphasis 
is on “pernicious forms of socialization.” Admittedly, oppression in general can take 
other forms, such as economic deprivation or political marginalization. As such, it is 
possible that other external constraints might also undermine autonomy. For the sake of 
space, I will not deal with those here. 
 36Ibid., pp. 62-64. 
  
 
agree. I believe you can make an autonomous decision to submit yourself 
to another’s authority in certain circumstances. What makes the Surren-
dered Wife’s decision problematic in a way that the monk’s decision is 
not is that her decision reflects internalized social norms that devalue her 
worth as a moral being. In contrast, barring any extenuating circum-
stances, there is no reason to believe the monk’s decision was motivated 
by internalized oppressive norms. In fact, part of his motivation could be 
the enhanced social standing he will receive as a result of his decision.37 
In this way, the Surrendered Wife raises the feminist intuition in a way 
that the monk does not. 
 I believe the two interpretations outlined above are enough to explain 
why the Surrendered Wife’s decision should not count as autonomous. In 
my third interpretation, I return to the question of why a substantive 
theory is better able to address the feminist intuition than procedural 
theories. Here I will perform a more in-depth analysis to show why pro-
cedural autonomy theories have trouble with this sort of example or why 
a substantive theory is necessary for feminist autonomy theorists. 
 What would a procedural autonomy theorist say about a woman’s 
decision to become a Surrendered Wife? All of the women quoted earlier 
made an active decision to change the parameters of their relationships. 
Therefore, they had to have some level of self-reflection when making 
this radical shift in their behavior and lifestyle. Doyle admits that she is 
constantly struggling to live up to her ideal of the Surrendered Wife 
which implies that she continues to reflect on her decision. Many of the 
other women seem to imply a similar sort of reflection and active deci-
sion-making. Skye says about her pre-surrendered wife relationship: “I 
would say I was trying to rule the roost, I was trying to take over, I was 
like, ‘Hey, I don’t think you know how things work around here, pal. I 
don’t think you quite get that I’m the boss here’ and that’s the way it 
works in relationships.” In contrast, here is how Skye feels about being a 
Surrendered Wife: “I’ve discovered through experience, doing it for 
three years, that usually if I had done it the way that I was going to do it, 
it wouldn’t have turned out as great as it did when he made the decision. 
He wears the trousers, absolutely, without a shadow of the doubt. I 
wouldn’t have it any other way.”38 Based on these comments, I believe 
that the women would pass a procedural theorist’s criteria for an auto-
nomous decision. 
 To show why procedural theorists would have to consider the Surren-
dered Wife’s decision autonomous, I return to Friedman’s theory of   
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autonomy. In Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Friedman considers whether 
romantic love is a threat to women’s autonomy. In her discussion of ro-
mantic love, Friedman admits that women are subject to social pressures 
that devalue women’s autonomy, belittle women’s aspirations that do not 
include caring for others, and encourage women to subsume their values 
and beliefs to love relationships regardless of whether that is their prima-
ry concern.39 She further acknowledges that (because of these social 
pressures) heterosexual romantic love poses a greater threat to women’s 
autonomy than men’s autonomy. Yet, Friedman claims that as long as a 
woman has made the relationship her self-defining value, then sustaining 
that relationship is an expression of autonomy for her.  
 
The relationship now is, by definition, the woman’s overriding concern for which she 
will sacrifice other important values ... As such, it is a self-defining commitment for her. 
By acting in accord with that commitment, a woman does not actually give up autonomy; 
instead she shows a significant degree of it. Thus a woman who values her relationships 
more than she values autonomy, and who acts to maintain her romantic relationship, be-
comes autonomous after all.40 
 
According to Friedman, the woman must use some level of self-
reflection in making her decision. Obviously, the Surrendered Wives are 
reflective about their decision. Similarly, Friedman argues that once 
women take on the relationship (or in this case being a Surrendered 
Wife) as a self-defining commitment, then living up to that commitment 
is an expression of their autonomy. Again, these comments show that the 
women have embraced the role of the Surrendered Wife. In sum, I be-
lieve Friedman would have to consider the decisions to become a Sur-
rendered Wife autonomous. 
 If the love relationship is this woman’s self-defining commitment and 
a reflection of her autonomy, then we must assume (by Friedman’s own 
definition of autonomy) that this value had to be put through some 
process of self-reflection that was not the result of coercion or manipula-
tion. The question we can now ask is: Do the social pressures Friedman 
acknowledges add up to coercion, deception, and manipulation? Stoljar 
claims that feminists will question whether preferences influenced by 
oppressive norms of femininity can be autonomous. In her procedural 
account of autonomy, Friedman acknowledges the influence of feminine 
socialization on personal preferences, but she does not go on to explain 
how the procedure for autonomous decision-making can rule out prefe-
rences developed through oppressive socialization as autonomous.41 For 
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 40Ibid., p. 137. 
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example, do oppressive social influences skew the process of critical re-
flection? 
 Friedman begins with an analysis of social pressures, but ends by 
claiming that values reflectively endorsed are autonomous. As Stoljar 
points out, “The question for all theories of autonomy is what kinds of 
socialization are incompatible with autonomy.”42 To understand why 
oppressive socialization is problematic in a way that nonoppressive so-
cialization is not, we need to look more closely at how it (potentially) 
skews the process of critical reflection (or the exact question Friedman 
avoids). Along with Stoljar, I believe we can adequately address this 
problem only by using a strong substantive theory. To show how a strong 
substantive theory can begin to deal with the problem of internalized op-
pression (and further illustrate the problem with procedural theories), I 
turn to the work of Paul Benson. 
 In “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” Benson attempts to 
give “an explanation of the autonomy-inhibiting effects of some sociali-
zation while sustaining the nonskeptical conclusion that a good deal of 
our socialization, though it influences us profoundly, need not interfere 
with autonomy.”43 Like Meyers, Benson agrees that we cannot escape 
the influence of socialization. The key is to find a way to distinguish be-
tween pernicious and benign socialization. Benson uses the example of 
feminine beauty norms to argue that feminine socialization causes wom-
en to internalize oppressive norms—namely, the idea that women should 
make themselves physically appealing to men. He further argues that 
these norms undermine women’s autonomy because they cause women 
to internalize false beliefs (such as that their worth is tied to their attrac-
tiveness to men) and keeps them from being able to “critically evaluate” 
these false beliefs.  
 
I have suggested that feminine socialization gains much of its power by operating to 
deceive many women about the significance that cultivating an appearance which is 
pleasing to men has for women’s worth as persons. Women’s autonomy is reduced to the 
extent that they are socially trained to be blind to the reasons there are for them to regard 
their appearance differently than the norms of femininity recommend.44 
 
In his substantive theory, Benson adds a critical competence criterion 
that requires an autonomous person to be able to “detect and appreciate 
                                                                                                             
themselves involve sacrifices of her autonomy in other ways” (ibid., pp. 137-38). Specifi-
cally, the woman must have and periodically use some autonomy skills. At this point, we 
could ask whether Friedman is sneaking substantive requirements into her procedural 
theory. To avoid confusion, I will not pursue this question here. 
 42Stoljar, “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition,” p. 97. 
 43Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” p. 386. 
 44Ibid., p. 403. 
 
 
the reasons there are to act in various ways.”45 He argues that feminine 
socialization concerning feminine beauty norms undermines this critical 
competence.46 
 While I am not convinced that Benson adequately distinguishes be-
tween pernicious and benign forms of socialization,47 his analysis does 
help articulate what is wrong with a procedural approach. Benign and 
pernicious socialization can influence the process of critical reflection in 
the same way. Later in the article, Benson admits that men as well as 
women internalize cultural standards for feminine beauty norms and as a 
result men “may be blinded systematically to important reasons there are 
for them to treat women differently.”48 Yet, Benson also admits that this 
socialization does not undermine men’s autonomy in the same way it 
undermines women’s. I believe this is because the real problem with op-
pressive socialization is not that it undermines critical competence or 
unduly narrows the reasons for action we will consider (many forms of 
socialization can do this). What is truly harmful about internalized op-
pression is the way it undermines a person’s sense of self-worth, and  
thereby makes her complicit in her own oppression.49 
 We could make an analogy here between the procedure for autonom-
ous decision-making and cooking chicken and dumplings. Most recent 
theories of autonomy acknowledge that individuals are embedded in a 
social context, and as a result will internalize a variety of social norms. 
Similarly, I begin the process of cooking chicken and dumplings by 
combining a variety of ingredients—vegetables, chicken, broth, and 
spices. After combining the ingredients, I let them simmer so that the 
various flavors mingle and infuse each other. Allowing my dish to sim-
mer is similar to the process of reflection used by procedural theorists. 
The individual considers preferences, but only from within her social 
context. Her social context and personal history (the ingredients put into 
                                                 
 45Ibid., p. 397. 
 46Benson does not argue that all feminine socialization does this or that any woman 
who chooses to adhere to feminine beauty norms lacks critical competence. His example 
assumes that the young woman accepts these norms and would not reject them even if 
they were put through a process of reflection that pointed out how feminine beauty norms 
were tied to a system that serves men’s interest. In other words, she has internalized 
norms that connect her beauty to her personal worth and cannot critically reflect on the 
larger reasons for action or reasons why she might wish to reject or resist those norms. 
 47In fairness, Benson has significantly revised his approach since this early article, 
and, as I will mention later, I believe some of his later work more accurately captures the 
nature of the problem. 
 48Benson, “Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization,” p. 403. 
 49Benson more accurately articulates this problem of a lack of self-worth in later 
articles. See Paul Benson, “Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Re-
sponsibility,” in Mackenzie and Stoljar (eds.), Relational Autonomy, pp. 72-93; Benson, 
“Free Agency and Self-Worth.” 
  
 
the mix) will influence the process of reflection. Moreover, her various 
preferences will influence each other (in the way various ingredients in-
fuse each other with their distinct flavors). After simmering for a while, I 
must strain out bones and other unwanted “bits.” In this way, I keep what 
I want in the dish, but get rid of what I do not want. Similarly, procedural 
theorists believe the process of critical reflection allows the individual to 
“strain out” unwanted preferences while solidifying her commitment to 
the ones that are left. 
 Returning to the problem of oppressive versus nonoppressive sociali-
zation, my argument is that they function in the same way in the proce-
dure for autonomous decision-making. The process of reflection and 
identification proceeds in the same way for every internalized norm just 
as the process of making chicken and dumplings will proceed in the same 
way (combining ingredients, simmering, and straining the final product), 
no matter what ingredients are put in. However, I can make the dish in-
edible by adding poison—for example, arsenic. The arsenic does not dis-
rupt the process of making chicken and dumplings, but it makes the final 
dish inedible. In addition, to understand why I should not add this ingre-
dient to my dish, I have to understand the relationship between certain 
substances and human metabolism, not the mechanics of simmering and 
straining broths. I need to know something “outside” of the recipe or my 
understanding of how to prepare this dish. Similarly, we cannot strain or 
filter out oppressive norms using only a formal procedure for autonom-
ous decision-making. To understand what feminists find problematic 
about internalized oppressive norms (or why they should not be consi-
dered autonomous), we have to understand their relationship to other 
norms and how they position the individual in her social context. In other 
words, we need nonsubjective criteria. 
 Thus, Benson’s critical competence addition to the process of critical 
reflection is not enough. All socialization restricts options in this way. 
Given our previous histories and socialization, we are not open to all rea-
sons for action, nor would this be a good thing.50 In this way, both op-
pressive and nonoppressive socialization shape critical reflection in the 
same way. What is problematic about oppressive socialization is that it 
undermines a person’s sense of self-worth. This indirectly skews the 
process of critical reflection in a problematic way, because a person uses 
oppressive norms (that degrade her status as a human being) to make 
certain decisions. In other words, precisely what is wrong with these de-
cisions is that they rely on internalized oppressive norms. Benson more 
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see Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New 
York: Penguin, 2005). 
 
 
accurately captures this problem when he discusses the nature of the 
false belief (or how women are taught to tie feminine beauty norms to 
their personal worth). However, we cannot see this problem or fully arti-
culate it unless we step outside of the subjective perspective. Just be-
cause a person chooses to do X does not make it nonautonomous. If we 
consider that a person chooses to do X for reason Y and reason Y is an 
internalized norm that perpetuates oppression, then my substantive 
theory of autonomy would rule it out as autonomous.51 
 To summarize, the strong substantive approach I am advocating 
would analyze not just the self-reflective part of the decision-making 
process, but also how various desires or beliefs that motivate these deci-
sions are or are not influenced by pernicious forms of socialization. In 
her analysis, Stoljar analyzes a study of women and contraceptive risk-
taking completed by Kristen Luker. Stoljar argues that women’s contra-
ceptive choices 
 
are judged to be nonautonomous because they are overly influenced in their decisions 
about contraception by stereotypical and incorrect norms of femininity and sexual agen-
cy. Unlike risk-takers in other domains, such as those who smoke or fail to wear safety 
belts in a car, Luker’s subjects are motivated by oppressive and misguided norms that are 
internalized as a result of feminine socialization.52 
 
Similarly, I believe the Surrendered Wives are “motivated by oppression 
and misguided norms that are internalized as a result of feminine sociali-
zation.” The decision to become a Surrendered Wife meets the criteria I 
outlined earlier—it is the result of false beliefs that rely on subordinating 
reasoning (i.e., women should “surrender” or be subordinate to their hus-
bands) and perpetuate oppressive systems (i.e., the devaluing of women). 
However, we can articulate how these particular decisions are an exam-
ple of internalized oppression only by stepping outside of the subjective 
perspective. Therefore, we can capture what is truly wrong (or nonauto-
nomous) about these decisions only with a strong substantive theory of 
autonomy. 
 As I mentioned earlier, procedural theorists are committed to content 
neutrality because they do not want to rule out traditionally “feminine” 
values or goals as autonomous. While I applaud this goal, I worry that if 
we acknowledge oppressive social pressures without adequately analyz-
ing how they influence autonomy, then we will be left with a theory of 
autonomy that is too generous. I worry that if we ignore the feminist in-
tuition and call these cases autonomous, we will end up devaluing part of 
the harm of internalized oppression—namely, how it denigrates a person 
and makes her complicit in perpetuating her own oppression.   
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Addressing Procedural Theorists’ Concerns 
 
As we can see from the previous section, adopting a substantive theory 
of autonomy will narrow the scope of decisions that count as autonom-
ous by applying more rigorous standards, while procedural theories of 
autonomy include a broader range of decisions. One reason procedural 
autonomy theorists reject substantive autonomy theories is that they wor-
ry about how substantive theories might narrow the scope of autonomy. 
This is why procedural theorists are committed to content neutrality and 
the subjective perspective. One criticism that feminist philosophers made 
of traditional theories of autonomy is that they included masculine norms 
or required substantive independence. In response, feminist autonomy 
theorists wanted to create a conception of autonomy that included a broad 
range of lives, goals, and preferences. Thus, many procedural theorists 
worry that if we include nonsubjective criteria into autonomy we will 
again unduly restrict the scope of autonomy. In response, I would em-
phasize that we are talking about specific decisions, not entire lives. If 
we decide that decisions and actions that are the result of internalized 
oppression should not count as autonomous, then this does not mean that 
we believe individuals making these decisions have no autonomy. For 
example, an individual woman might be perfectly autonomous in her 
decisions about what career to pursue and whether or not to get married, 
but not autonomous in her decision to have a baby or get cosmetic sur-
gery. 
 Procedural theorists also worry that the kind of criteria substantive 
autonomy theorists, like myself, want to include will overemphasize 
women’s victimhood, and thereby ignore women’s agency. For example, 
in her critique of Paul Benson’s and Susan Babbitt’s theories, Diana 
Meyers states: “Restrictive, value-saturated accounts of autonomy are 
troubling because they promiscuously stigmatize women as victims and 
because they homogenize authentic selves and autonomous lives.”53 On 
the other hand, I worry that procedural autonomy theorists are too gener-
ous. If we call decisions influenced by oppressive socialization “auto-
nomous,” then do we devalue the harm of internalized oppression?54 I 
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believe “autonomy” should be held to a higher standard. However, I be-
lieve the implications of this are less far-reaching than procedural auton-
omy theorists believe. Similar to Baron and Hill, I am not interested in 
“blaming” the Deferential Wife or the Surrendered Wife for her decision. 
Nor do I believe arguing that many decisions are nonautonomous means 
we should not allow people to make them. As a society, we regularly 
allow people to make all kinds of stupid or self-destructive decisions. 
Instead, we can separate how we categorize specific decisions from dis-
cussions about what decisions people should be allowed to make. 
 In “The Kantian Conception of Autonomy,” Thomas Hill distinguish-
es between what he calls “autonomy as a right” and a “psychological 
conception of autonomy.”55 A psychological conception of autonomy 
means that a person “has a kind of independence of judgment which 
young children and unthinking conformists lack.”56 This is the concep-
tion of autonomy debated by personal autonomy theorists. In contrast, 
autonomy as a right has to do with the range of decisions a person is al-
lowed to make. 
 
To be an autonomous person, on this view [autonomy as a right], is to have a moral right 
to make certain decisions for oneself, to control certain aspects of one’s life without inter-
ference. The working analogy here, apparently, is with autonomous states, which are such 
not because they are governed in a particularly effective or high-minded way but because 
they have a right that other nations not interfere in their internal affairs.57  
 
If we accentuate this distinction, then we can have a more rigorous 
theory of personal or psychological autonomy (which more adequately 
accommodates the problem of internalized oppression) without under-
mining other feminist goals (e.g., it preserves autonomy as a right).58 
 Arguing that women should have autonomy as a right (by which I 
mean being allowed to fully participate in political and social systems 
and being allowed to make certain decisions about their own lives) does 
not require that I commit myself to a specific theory of personal auton-
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omy. I can remain agnostic about what personal autonomy actually re-
quires. To argue for autonomy as a right is to argue that similar groups 
should face similar limits. In other words, I can argue that women (and 
other subordinated groups) should be allowed to participate equally in 
the institution of limits (such as laws and customs) without committing 
myself to a specific theory of personal autonomy. The argument here is 
that in a given society, autonomy as a right (or the control over your life 
given to individuals) should be the same for all adults regardless of race, 
sex, and so on. In this way, autonomy as a right raises questions of jus-
tice. In contrast, personal or psychological autonomy seems to raise dif-
ferent (if related) questions that can be dealt with separately.59 
 In sum, feminist autonomy theorists should not fear strong substan-
tive theories of autonomy. Procedural theorists are correct that strong 
substantive theories would narrow the scope of decisions that count as 
autonomous. However, I hope I have shown that this is not the problem 
they fear it to be. If feminists embrace the distinction between autonomy 
as a right and psychological autonomy, we can continue to argue against 
oppressive norms that restrict women’s freedom and control over their 
lives while we continue to work on a more adequate theory of personal 
autonomy.60 
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